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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND APPRAISED VALUES IN THE HOTEL 
APPRAISAL PROCESS, 1981-1998 
Michael C. Dalbor 
and 
William P. Andrew 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that moti- 
vated principals in the hotel appraisal process to influence appraised hotel values. 
The economic circumstances are the background in which appraisals are completed 
and may be germane to the issue of appraisal accuracy. This paper outlines the 
relationships in the process and examines the specific circumstances that may have 
motivated the parties to influence appraised values to be different than market val- 
ues. Moreover, it provides a basis for further research and empirical tests of these 
rela tionships. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that impacted 
the motivations of principals in the hotel appraisal process. This paper will describe how 
mffering economic circumstances may have changed the desires of the principals across 
periods of time, potentially changing appraised values relative to market values. Ths  
paper discusses how a strong economy and other circumstances influenced most princi- 
pals to want appraised hotel values to be higher than market values. On the other hand, 
economic circumstances such as changes in tax laws or increased monitoring by federal 
regulators may have influenced principals to want appraised hotel values to be lower 
than market values. 
The paper first describes the important relationships in the hotel appraisal process. A 
brief review of appraisal accuracy literature is provided, along with a discussion of the 
serious nature of the appraisal accuracy problem. The economic circumstances of three 
mstinct periods are detailed next, including a discussion of the importance of lenders in 
the appraisal and their motivations. Some descriptive data are subsequently provided 
and followed by conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
Important Relationships in the Process 
The appraiser is the agent of various principals in the hotel appraisal process. The 
1 principals include the lender, buyer, seller, and appraisal monitoring authority. During 
, the 1980s, the buyer typically commissioned an appraiser directly and would subse- 
quently use the appraisal to "shop" for permanent financing. Although the other parties 
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were not explicit principals, they could provide selective or incomplete information to an 
appraiser in an effort to influence value. Additionally, there was no unified appraisal 
licensing authority that could regulate appraisers. Without an effective monitoring 
authority, appraisers were much more subject to the desires of the buyer, seller, and 
lender. 
The relationshps in the process changed in 1989 because of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). Buyers could no longer commission 
an appraisal directly if they were going to obtain financing from a federally insured lend- 
ing institution. Instead, appraisals were to be commissioned by lenders, thereby making 
the lender the most influential party in the process. The decision to make the lender 
responsible for commissioning appraisals was to help solve appraisal problems. Addi- 
tionally, appraisers were expected to be licensed and/or certified and to complete 
appraisals that met more stringent standards. 
In the 1990s, however, some researchers (Rudolph, 1994; Petuck, 1996) are skeptical 
about whether or not federal and state regulations have effectively altered the motiva- 
tions of the parties in the appraisal process regarding appraisal accuracy. Additionally, a 
recent survey of appraisers conducted by Smolen and Hambleton (1997) indicates that 
nearly 80% of appraisers reported that aggressive lenders are still asking them to change 
appraised values. Therefore, without the appropriate incentives to encourage accurate 
appraisals on a consistent basis, appraised values may be systematically hgher or lower 
than market values based upon the needs of the influential parties in the process. The 
needs of the parties may vary from time to time, depending on the prevailing economic 
and regulatory environment. 
Literature Review 
A review of the literature reveals appraisal accuracy concerns during particular time 
periods (such as the 1980s) without establishing similarities to or differences from other 
periods. Additionally, there has been only a limited amount of research completed about 
the agency relationshps in the appraisal process. Thus, an examination of exogenous fac- 
tors affecting the motivations of the parties in the process may help explain changes in 
appraisal outcomes. 
In a perfect steady state economy, appraised values should not differ significantly 
from sales prices in a systematic fashion. However, changes in economic circumstances 
or the regulatory environment may induce bias into t h s  process. Ths  is detailed by 
Webb (1994) who shows sign changes of differences between appraised values and sales 
prices of commercial properties during different time periods from 1978 through 1990. 
Similarly, we can examine why there are distinct time periods that involve changes in 
appraised values. 
The 1980s period is considered distinct primarily because of the tremendous effect 
the 1981 Tax Reform Act had on commercial real estate markets (Federal Deposit Insur- 
ance Corporation (FDIC), 1997). This tax law change, combined with an improving econ- 
omy of 1983-1984, produced an environment that encouraged real estate development. 
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Additionally, economic conditions were also generally favorable in the late 1980s. These 
circumstances provided an incentive for parties in the hotel appraisal process to want ap- 
praised values to be higher than market values. 
Conversely, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 largely had a negative impact on real estate 
returns. A study by Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1987) details the expected impact on 
real estate returns because of the decelerated depreciation schedules for commercial real 
estate. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also restricted the deductibility of passive losses of 
real estate investments. Ths change in the tax law may have had an opposite effect from 
the 1981 tax law change. Principals in the process may have been loolung to sell hotel 
properties rapidly, thereby influencing appraised hotel values to be lower than market 
values during the period immediately surrounding the enactment of Tax Reform Act of 
1986. 
Major regulatory changes affecting lendersprimarily savings and loan institu- 
tionehave been researched extensively by Kane (1989). The problems associated with 
commercial lending and appraisal practices were widely publicized by the U.S. House 
Committee on Government Operations (1986) in a startling report. A need for federal 
regulation of appraisers was not only recognized by legislators, but by appraisers them- 
selves (Dislun, Maroney, & Vickory, 1988; Duvoisin, 1988). This led to the enactment of 
FIRREA in late 1989, opening a new chapter in terms of the hotel appraisal process. 
FIRREA changed the appraisal landscape significantly by 1990. New appraisal stan- 
dards and guidelines were to be implemented along with state licensing as described by 
Hicken (1991). The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) began cleanup operations of in- 
solvent savings and loans by selling non-performing assets. Moreover, the Appraisal 
Institute was formed in 1991 to bolster confidence in the profession after much negative 
publicity in the late 1980s. 
With all of the measures coming into effect, the appraisal environment of the early 
I 
1990s was very different from that of the 1980s. Hanford (1994) and Petuck (1996) 
describe the overzealous and critical nature of commercial appraisal reviews. Appraisers 
were generally of the opinion that the regulatory pendulum had swung too far. This 
environment, however, was not to last very long. 
I By 1993, appraiser certification licensing laws had been phased in. A variety of new 
i banlung laws that had been enacted in previous years began to improve the condition of 
6 the nation's banking system (FDIC, 1997). Moreover, the United States was at the begin- 
6 
k ning of an economic expansion that is still in effect today. These changes led to a more 
relaxed atmosphere for appraisers, with comparisons of the mid-1990s being made to the 
r 1980s (Petuck, 1996). The survey by Smolen and Hambleton (1997) also reveals the gener- 
:. ally pro-development attitude of lenders during this period. 
k s  With the establishment in the literature of three different historical periods over the 
past two decades, we can examine the specific circumstances within each period that 
i may have influenced the parties in the appraisal process toward wanting higher or lower 
i appraised hotel values. 
ir 
bcononzic Circumstances 
Economic Circumstances 1981-1989 
Based upon an examination of economic indicators, the two recessions of the early 
1980s were from January through July 1980 and July 1981 through November 1982 (Rog- 
ers, 1994). These recessions contributed to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1981 in 
estate development by increasing real estate depreciation tax shelds. 
The tax sheld increase, combined with the availability of large foreign and domestic 
commercial real estate (Roulac, 1994). For examp& new hotel room construction in the 
160,000 in 1985, and approximately 150,000 in 1986.l 
Hotel supply generally lags behnd an increase in demand by approximately 18 to 24 
chise, secure financing, and complete construction.  heref fore, an improving economy in 
late 1982 or early 1983 could initiate the hotel development process and result in a newly 
completed hotel sometime in 1984. 
Table 1 shows the U.S. average hotel occupancy and new hotel room construction ac- 
1984, whch led to new hotel room construction in 1985 and 1986. The new rooms de- 
creased occupancy somewhat in those two years, but demand remained relatively strong 
throughout the rest of the decade. In fact, according to PKF Consulting data, occupancy 
levels increased steadily from 1986 through 1989 as shown in table 1. 
Table 1 
New hotel room construction and annual occupancv 
Year New Hotel Rooms Average Annual Occupancy Rate 
1983 120,000 64.4% 
1984 140,000 67.8% 
1985 160,000 66.9% 
1986 150,000 65.6% 
1987 120,000 65.8% 
1988 110,000 66.3% 
1989 110,000 67.2% 
Note. The new hotel rooms column data are rounded. 
The data in this table are adapted from Bill Saporito, "Boom at the Inn," Time, July 8,1996, p. 43 and PKF 
Consulting, Trends, 1983-1989. 
Saporito, Bill, "Boom at the Inn," Time, 8 July 1996, p. 43. I 
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1 The tax incentives of the 1981 Tax Reform act improved the return performance of 1 
1 1 
commercial real estate by increasing the depreciation tax shield. In this environment, 
lenders such as commercial banks, thrifts, pension funds, and life insurance companies 
I sought to increase real estate lending. This encouraged them to have appraisals com- 
ple&d that would justify a lending decision. 
In the days before FIRREA, developers could commission an appraisal themselves 
and then subsequently "shop" the appraisal around in search of financing. Developers, 
who wanted to build hotel rooms, had a vested interest in obtaining an appraised value 
at or above construction cost. Commercial loan officers at commercial banks and thrifts 
were eager to earn loan origination fees and receive the developer's business. These par- 
ties could easily influence the appraiser, who was heavily dependent on them for 
business. Thus, the relationships motivated developers and lenders to increase appraised 
values. 
The Role of Lenders during the 1980s 
Commercial banks and thrifts played a large role in the increase in hotel room supply 
and the resulting disintermediation, were forced into "gambling" on real estate projects 
I thrifts, were seriouslv committed to increasing the amount of commercial real estate 
5 by banks in commercial real estate through the 1980s is shown in the table 2. 
Table 2 
Real estate and commercial real estate loans for domestic 
national banks in the United States. 1981-1989 
Year Total Loans Real estate As a percent- Commercial As a percentage 
(in millions) loans age of total real estate of total loans 
(in millions) loans loans 
(in millions) 
1981 $669 $168 25.1 % $36 5.4% 
1982 728 180 24.7% 40 5.5% 
1983 786 200 25.4% 46 5.9% 
1984 924 232 25.1% 56 6.1 % 
1985 998 264 26.4% 67 6.7% 
1986 1,073 308 28.7% 82 7.6% 
1987 1,113 358 32.2% 100 8.9% 
1988 1.185 408 34.4% 115 9.7% 
1989 1,271 466 36.7% 132 10.4% 
in the 1980s. Some of them, because of a large increase in interest rates in the early 1980s 
in order to earn hgher returns. Commercial lenders, particularG commercial bankssand 
./ u 
loans in their portfolios. As an example of that commitment, the increased involvement 
Note. The data regarding total loans, real estate loans, and commercial real estate loans are adapted from the 
Comptroller of the Currency Quarterly Journal 1981-1991, 1992, p. 125. 
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investors such as pension funds became much more interested in commercial real estate 
investments. According; to a 1984 survey, more funds were interested in owning; real 
indication of interest in commercial propertv, including; hotels. The overall interest bv 1 
Year Number of funds owning real estate Percentage owning real estate 
1981 90 44% 
1982 120 47% 
1983 123 50% 
1984 132 47% 
Note. The data in this table are adapted from "Real estate investing by pension funds-1984," Pension World 
20 (September 1984), p. 24. 
Overall, the atmosphere of many lenders seelung higher returns via commercial real 
estate may have motivated lenders and others in the process to seek hgher appraised 
values. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Other Changes 
By 1986, the circumstances affecting commercial real estate development began to 
Ths act and a subsequent improvement in economic conditions encouraged extensive 1 
- -  - 
ple, one study showed a 30city average commercial office vacancy rate for 1980 to be 
only 4.2%, but by 1986, the vacancy rate increased to 17.2% .2 Given the large increases in 
new hotel construction, investors began to worry about oversupply. This oversupply had 
a carryover effect into the late 1980s and early 1990s, exerting downward pressure on 
appraised values. 
Another major effect was the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This legislation had a negative 
impact on the commercial real estate industry because of the treatment of passive losses 
and the lengthening of depreciation schedules. At the time, experts tried to predict what 
effects the 1986 Tax Reform Act would have on real estate returns. Brueggeman and 
Thibodeau (1987) hvpothesized that in order to maintain investment returns for inves- 
'Wheaton, William C., "The Cyclic Behavior of the National Office Market," Amel-ican Real I 
Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal, Vol. 15 (1987), p. : 
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8 period would have to decline between approximately 17% and 25% to maintain the rates 
made some investors and lenders (particularly institutional lenders) reconsider financ- 
ing hotel projects. Some principals who had only become involved in the hotel business 
for tax purposes wanted to sell properties fast or only lend on lower-priced "bargain" 
properties. Economic conditions not only lowered prices, but may also have encouraged 
lower appraised values in the period immediately before, during, and after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (i.e., 1985-1987). 
Economic circumstances had encouraged aggressive development in most hotel mar- 
kets throughout most of the 1980s. This increase in supply was beginning to exert an 
adverse impact on hotel operating performance by the end of the decade. The average 
12% of total revenue in 1981. Despite some modest increases in occupancy during the 
figure subsequently fell to a low of negative 5% in 1987. The taxable income figure 
Additionally, commercial banks were forced to handle more real estate problems. As 
the decade wore on and the oversupply of commercial real estate increased, banks were 
foreclosing on an increasing number of mortgages secured bv commercial properties. 
Table 4 
Real estate owned bv domestic national bartks. 1981-1989 
Year Total Assets Real estate owned" As a percentage 
(in millions) (in millions) of total assets 
1981 $1,202 $1.5 .12% 
1982 1,296 2.5 .19% 
1983 1,392 2.9 .21% 
1984 1,497 3.3 .22 % 
1985 1,630 3.9 .24% 
1986 1,740 5.0 .29 % 
1987 1,770 6.2 .35% 
1988 1,846 6.7 .36% 
1989 1,976 9.2 .47% 
Note. The data regarding real estate owned means other than bank premises. The data are adapted from the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Quartel-ly Journal 1981-1991, 1992, p. 116. 
Pannell Kerr Forster, k d s  in the Hotel lndus t~y  (1991), p. 5. 
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While the real estate owned statistics include all types of real estate, they correlate 
strongly with the number of hotel failures during the 1990s. By the late 1980s, hotel fail- 
ures had increased 40% over 1984 levels. Historical hotels and other lodging place failure 
statistics are shown in table 5. 
Hotel and other lodging place business failures in the United States, 1984-1997 1 
Year Number 
1984 245 
1985 303 
1986 313 
1987 336 
1988 313 
1989 260 
1990 411 
1991 510 
1992 495 
1993 424 
1994 334 
1995 322 
1996 233 
1997 261 
Note. The data is this table are adapted from Dun and Bradstreet's 
Record of Business Failui-es, 1984-1 997. 
The aggressive position of lenders, brokers, and others in the development of new 
- -  - 
dition. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 may have changed the hotel investment environment f l  
during the time period immediately preceding and following the passage of the legsla- 
tion. Nevertheless, after the initial impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had "shaken out" I 
the market, a relatively strong economy prevailed and continued to encourage hotel 
investment. On the other hand. the continuing ~roblems with commercial lenders forced 1 
1989. Ths  legslation altered the relationships between the parties in the process and got 
government authorities more involved in the monitoring of appraisal practices. 
Economic Circumstances 199Q-1992 
For thrifts and commercial banks, earlv warnings of problems with the deposit insur- 
savings and loan insurance funds. The Federal savings and Loan Insurance corporation 1 
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(FSLIC) became insolvent by 1986, and the FDIC experienced two consecutive years of 
losses in 1988 and 1989.~ FSLIC was finally dissolved when FIRREA was enacted in 
August 1989. 
I FIRREA sent a signal to the nation's lending institutions that the government was 
i going to pursue extensive monitoring practices in the heretofore largely unmonitored 
" lending process. As previously stated, FIRREA intended to force appraisers to be more 1 rigorous in their analysis of properties, and for banks to be much more familiar with the 
appraisal process. Moreover, the legislation would like appraisals to have greater consid- 
eration in the loan approval process. 
In the meantime, while new appraisal standards were being phased in during this 
period, economic conditions had begun to decline. Another recession began in July 1990 
and lasted through March 1991. In terms of hotel values, the Hotel Motel Brokers of 
America (HMBA) reported the peak selling price to be $23,630 per room in 1988. Three 
years later, the average sales price was $18,400 per room, a decline of approximately 22%. 
Thus, it appears that the Brueggeman and Thibodeau study, which predicted a decline in 
value of between 17% and 25%, was reasonably accurate. An oversupply of hotel rooms, 
declining economic conditions, and uncertainty in the lending community had had a 
negative impact on hotel sales prices. 
An examination of the changes from late 1980s to the early 1990s in hotel occupancy, 
average room rate, and RevPAR describes national market conditions for the hotel indus- 
try. Historical hotel operating statistics are shown in table 6. 
Table 6 
Average annual occupancy average room rate and 
RevPAR in the United States, 1988-1996 
Year Occupancy % ADR $ RevPAR 
1988 66.3% $72.67 $48.18 
1989 67.2% $73.24 $49.21 
1990 66.2% $78.76 $52.14 
1991 65.2% $75.14 $48.99 
1992 66.0% $77.05 $50.85 
1993 67.5% $77.47 $52.29 
1994 70.4% $79.56 $56.01 
1995 71.5% $84.46 $60.39 
1996 71.1% $91.60 $65.13 
Note. The data in t h s  table are adapted from PKF Consulting, fiends, 1988-1996. 
Dotsey, M. & Kuprianov, Anatoli, "Reforming Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Savings 
and Loan Crisis," Economic Review (Federal Rese~*ve Bank of Richmond) Vol. 76 (1990), pp. 3-28. 
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As shown in table 6, 1991 was the worst year for the hotel industry in many years. 
Both occupancy and average room rate declined, with occupancy lower than at any time 
in the 1980s. Additionally, hotels were forced to cut rates to even maintain a relatively 
low level of occupancy. These circumstances, combined with new regulations, were im- 
pacting the motivations of the lenders to the hotel industry. 
Commercial Lenders 1990-1 992 1 
Commercial banks and th rifts were forced to handle an increasing amount of fore- 
closed real estate. The percentage of national bank assets that were RE0 had increased 
from .12 percent in 198; to .73 Grcent in 1990 and .89 percent in 1991. Additionally, the 
number of hotel failures was rising dramatically. As shown in table 5, hotel failures aver- 1 
aged 472 per year during the 1 
By this time, the full effect of FIRREA had been felt. In August 1990, government reg- 
ulations stipulated that for appraisal purposes, an outside appraiser was to be hired 
directly by the financial institution or its designated agent. The appraiser was expected 
to have no direct or indirect in1 :erest in the property being appraised. Additionally, banks 
were to begin using state certified or licensed appraisers no later than December 31,1992 1 (Hicken, 1991). 
Commercial bank officers were very much aware that they were being scrutinized 
carefully after FIRREA was enacted.   here was pressure on banks that owned hotels to 
sell them to satisfy federal regulators and "get them off the books." A low appraisal 
could help sell the property more quickly and give the impression of bank management 
competency if the sales prices of assets were above appraised values. 
In addition, banks that we !re providing financing for buyers were also cautious and 
wanted to decrease exposure by lowering loan amounts via lower appraisals and by 
requiring increased equity contributions from buyers. Commercial lenders have long 
been aware that increasing loan-to-value ratios exemplifies risky behavior (Von Fursten- 
berg, 1970). Banks wanted to demonstrate to federal regulators a decrease in risky behav- 
ior because of the increased monitoring from federal regulators. 
In an agency theory context, an agent may take actions in his best economic interest 
even if they are detrimental to the principal. By the early 1990s, the agents (the bank 
owner and managers) were well aware that principals (the depositors and the deposit 
insurance fund) were monitoring them to ensure outcomes in the agents' best interests. 
In t h s  case, that meant talung actions to reduce loan losses and depletion of the deposit 
insurance fund. 
Regulatory forbearance was a policy where federal regulators kept insolvent banks 
open in hopes of not disrupting the banking system and thinlung that economic condi- 
tions would improve to rescue insolvent banks. The regulatory forbearance policy of the 
1980s was also applied to savings and loans in the southwestern United States, particu- 
larly Texas (Cole, 1993). However, the FDIC, which closed relatively few banks in the 
early and mid 1980s, began to close a large number of banks during the late 1980s and 
into the early 1990s. The number of closings is shown in table 7. 
Table 7 
FDIC closing and assistance transactions in the United States, 1980-1992 
Year Number 
1980 10 
1981 10 
1982 42 
1983 48 
1984 79 
1985 120 
1986 138 
1987 184 
1988 200 
1989 206 
1990 168 
1991 124 
1992 120 
Note. These data include national banks, state member banks, federal 
savings banks and state savings banks. Adapted from the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Annual Report, 1995, p. 107. 
Additional evidence of monitoring the agents at banks is an examination of the num- 
ber of Compliance Enforcement Actions initiated by the FDIC during the early 1990s. 
These actions include cease and desist orders, removal of bank officers, and termination 
of deposit insurance. The historical record of these actions is shown in table 8. 
Table 8 
Compliance enforcement actions initiated by the FDIC, 1989-1992 
Year Number 
1989 228 
1990 255 
Note. These data are adapted from Federal Deposit Insurance 
Co~poration Annual Report, 1995, p. 45. 
The large increase of enforcement actions in the early 1990s was a warning to bank 
officers. Additionally, appraisers were also aware of the new scrutiny and were wary of 
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providing overly aggressive values above sales prices. Based on the increased monitor- 
ing by federal agencies and the new appraisal regulations, the preceding evidence may 
indicate that principals in the process were wary of hotel investment during the 1990-92 
period, pushing appraised values below market values. 
Institutional Lenders 1990-1 992 
Pension funds and life insurance companies were also becoming aware of market 
conditions for commercial real estate. The decreases in real estate returns due to the 1986 
tax law were considered soon afterwards by Brueggeman and Thibodeau (1987) and 
have already been discussed. The performance of real estate assets is measured by the 
Russell-NCREIF index, whch uses quarterly appraisals and sales data (when a property 
is sold) to measure performance. Ths  can be used as a benchmark for the pension fund 
manager. 
Unlike commercial banks, however, pension fund managers value the assets in their 
funds internally every quarter. Fund managers will commission an outside appraisal 
once per vear, usuallv at vear-end. Nevertheless, pension fund managers have a vested I 
I d '  V 
interest in the valuatLon oi the assets in their fund.l~iven that most pension fund manag- 
ers are compensated based on the value of the assets in their fund,- thev must seek hiih 1 
I d U 
returns in order to attract more capital contributions to the fund, and thus, more assets 
(Gullkey, Miles, & Cole, 1989). 
By 1987, however, institutional managers had become concerned about the oversup- 
ply of real estate and the overvaluation of assets. Salomon Brothers, for example, issued a 
report in 1986 that discussed the overvaluation of office buildings. The Russell/NCREIF 
index h t  a peak in 1986, with the ratio of market value to replacement cost being nearly 
equal (i.e., "1"). Declines in the index began in 1987. One study estimated that office 
buildings were overvalued by approximatelv 30% during the 1986-1989 period (as 
compared to the Russell-NCREIF index), but the gap between the two values closed sig- 
nificantly by 1992 (Hendershott & Kane, 1995). - 
Fund managers had an incentive to maintain appraised values in declining markets 
and "smooth" real estate returns, which may have led to overappraising of assets. How- 
ever, studies have been completed which compare the sales prices of properties from the 
I I 
R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - N C R E I F  database td their appraised (slues. ~ l t h o u i h  otels were not included, 
a study showed that sales prices exceeded appraised values for all property types from 
1986 through the thrd  quarter of 1987. However, the opposite was true for properties 
from the fourth quarter of 1987 through 1990 (Webb, 1994). 
The oversupply and overvaluation of real estate was a concern for institutional len- 
ders. Pension fund equity investment in real estate, which slowlv began to increase dur- 
ing the 1980s, peaked;n i990 and began to decline steadily afterGard;. Table 9 details the 
decline in pension fund equity investment in real estate from 1987 through 1992. 
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Table 9 
Pension fund equity real estate investments as a percentage of assets, 1987-1992 
Year Percentage of Assets 
1987 3.28% 
1988 3.34% 
1989 3.50% 
1990 3.74% 
1991 3.58% 
1992 3.23% 
Note. These data are adapted from Edward J. Farragher and Robert 
Kleiman, "How pension funds make real estate investment deci- 
sions," Real Estate Review 25 (1996), p. 18. 
Additionally, gven the fear of "oversupply" of commercial real estate in many mar- 
kets at the time, institutional investors were begnning to become wary of real estate in- 
vestments. Furthermore, these lenders were able to effectively assess the likely decline in 
property values that was to last for an unknown period of time. As previously discussed, 
hotel sales values declined significantly by the early 1990s. 
Given the likely decline in values and reduced returns, institutional lenders may 
have been seelung very low-priced investment opportunities in hotel properties and 
commercial real estate or perhaps rejecting them altogether by the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Therefore, this would provide a motivation for a lower appraisal of a property be- 
ing financed to provide maximum protection of principal or even rationale to reject the 
loan applicant. This may indicate that sales prices exceeded appraised values of hotels 
for institutional lenders during the 1990-1992 period. 
Economic Circumstances 1993-1 998 
Economic circumstances had begun to improve by 1993. Construction of new rooms 
in the U.S. was down to approximately 35,000 while profits were positive for the first 
time since 1985. By 1994, sales prices had increased to $19,068 per room, the hghest since 
1990? 
In terms of occupancy, average daily rate, and RevPAR, the hotel industry overall 
made dramatic increases over the later 1980s and early 1990s. As shown in table 6, occu- 
I pancies climbed above the 70% mark for the first time since the late 1970s. 
I Furthermore, as shown in table 5, hotel failures declined to 233 in 1996. Between 1993 
and 1997, failures averaged 315 per year, which is close to the 19841989 average of 295 
I annual failures. 
i 
5 Hotel Motel Brokers Association, HMBA Hotel Real Estate Annual Report (1995), p. 26. 
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remaining wary of real estate investment. Therefore, this led them to keep appraised val- 
ues lower than sales prices. 
Overall, the positive economic circumstances and diminished monitoring may have 
led to lenders influencing appraisers for higher appraised values. On the other hand, 
institutional lenders who were "burned" by bad commercial real estate investments in 
the early 1990s have shied away from extensive hotel lending despite improving eco- 
nomic conditions. Thus, the motivations of the principals may indeed affect appraised 
values relative to market values. 
Descriptive Data and Analysis 
A descriptive data analysis was completed to provide a preliminary assessment of 
the economic circumstances and their potential effect on appraised hotel values. A total 
of 112 appraised hotel values were gathered in conjunction with their respective market 
values. Since appraised values are proprietary data and not contained within a central 
source, the data were difficult to obtain. Therefore, the sample sizes are relatively small 
during certain periods of interest and must be considered carefully when interpreting the 
results. 
The data available ranged from 1985 through 1998. An observation is considered to 
be the difference between the appraised value and its market values measured by (ap- 
praised value-sale priceslsales price). The sales prices of the hotels were matched to the 
date of appraisal using a pricing index documented by deRoos and Corgel (1996). This 
method uses a hedonic price index and is considered by academics to be the most accu- 
rate way to measure changes in lodgng values over time. 
The observations were examined based upon the time periods of interest and the 
types of lenders involved in the purchase (commercial or institutional). The periods are 
19851987 (to show the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act); 1988-1989; 1990-1992; and 
1993-1998. Unfortunately no data were available for 1985. The descriptive data are 
shown in the table below. 
Table 10 
Differences between appraised hotel values and market values, 1985-1998 
Period Sample Lender Type Expected mean Actual mean 
Size difference (+ or -) difference 
19851987 10 All - -8.30% 
1988-1989 17 All + +14.19% 
1990-1992 21 All - -1.50% 
1993-1998 59 Commercial Banks + +6.99% 
1993-1998 5 Institutional - +1.16% 
Note. These data represent the mean percentage difference between appraised hotel values and their respec- 
tive sales prices. Lender type is either commercial bank or institutional lender (insurance company pension 
fund, etc.). A "+" indicates an appraised value to be higher than the sales price. 
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